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To learn more about the governance of sport organizations, this study explored what meaning board members 
of national sport organizations (NSOs) attach to the concept of “strategic capability”. In so doing, the inquiry 
also identified factors considered to constrain or enable board strategic function. This paper draws on a body of 
knowledge developed over 38 years on board strategic function, primarily from the commercial setting but also 
from the emerging body of work in the nonprofit and sport governance setting. Located within the interpretive 
research paradigm this study engaged a range of different qualitative methods including cognitive mapping 
and visual imagery. Working across two NSOs in New Zealand, four elements were generated that served as 
reference points in mapping out the meaning of a strategically able board. These were categorized as the need 
to have capable people, a frame of reference, facilitative board processes, and facilitative regional relationships.
 “Boards are identified theoretically as the crucial 
lynchpin at the head of the organization .... In practice, 
they are also the point at which the buck stops” (Pye, 
2004, p. 65). Pye also noted that as the highest decision-
making level in an organization, boards, “in both theory 
and practice, have always been treated slightly differently 
than other areas and levels of group decision-making in 
organizations” (p. 65). In the sport management domain, 
governance is also considered to be one of the most 
influential elements for the success of a nonprofit sport 
organization (Balduck, Van Rossem, & Buelens, 2010). 
Unlike commercial organizations, nonprofit sporting 
bodies in Canada, the UK, Australia and New Zealand 
are traditionally governed by a volunteer board which 
serves to direct limited resources via limited staffing 
capacity. As a consequence, the voluntary board, capable 
of attracting significant expertise, can be a nonprofit sport 
organization’s most critical asset (Ferkins, Shilbury, & 
McDonald, 2009).
The question remains, however, as to whether cur-
rent sport governance models are realizing the potential 
of those sitting around the board room table. The general 
consensus in any industry identifies both the performance 
role, or forward looking role of the board, and confor-
mance, the monitoring and accountability function, to be 
key responsibilities of the board (Ruigrok, Peck, & Keller, 
2006). Despite agreement on these dual functions, most 
prior research (emanating largely from the commercial 
domain) has concentrated on the conformance role of the 
board (Stiles, 2001). Stimulated in large part by the work 
of Forbes and Milliken (1999), McNulty and Pettigrew 
(1996, 1999), and Pettigrew and McNulty (1995, 1998), 
some scholars, in turning their attention to the performance 
role and in particular the strategic function of the board, 
have begun to focus on board strategic processes (Kerr & 
Werther, 2008; Pugliese, Bezemer, Zattoni, Huse, Van den 
Bosch, & Volberda, 2009; Siciliano, 2008). Within this 
emerging body of literature, however, there is still a lack 
of consensus about the board’s strategic role and it remains 
an ambiguous concept (Pugliese & Wenstøp, 2007).
In the sport management setting, a small but growing 
number of studies have considered governance. In par-
ticular, scholars have concentrated on the areas of shared 
leadership (Auld & Godbey, 1998; Ferkins, Shilbury, & 
McDonald, 2009; Hoye, 2004, 2006; Hoye & Cuskelly, 
2003a, 2004; Inglis, 1997a), board motivation (Inglis, 
1994) and executive committee cohesion (Doherty & 
Carron, 2003), board roles (Inglis, 1997b; Shilbury, 
2001; Yeh & Taylor, 2008; Yeh, Taylor, & Hoye, 2009), 
and board structure and performance (Hoye & Cuskelly, 
2003b; Kikulis, 2000; Papadimitriou, 1999; Shilbury, 
2001; Taylor & O’Sullivan, 2009). In this emerging 
field of inquiry, the term “sport governance” has come 
to mean the practice of governance applied to the sport-
ing context (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). In essence, sport 
governance is “the responsibility for the functioning and 
overall direction of the organization and is a necessary 
and institutionalized component of all sport codes from 
club level to national bodies, government agencies, sport 
service organizations and professional teams around the 
world” (Ferkins, Shilbury, & McDonald, 2009, p. 245). 
As such, many scholars in this field have taken their lead 
from more established research domains in seeking to 
determine the efficacy of applying major theoretical con-
structs to sport. Consequently, agency theory, stewardship 
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theory, resource dependency theory, institutional theory 
and stakeholder theory, for example, have been employed 
to help explain the sport governance phenomenon. Curi-
ously, few as yet have specifically addressed the strategic 
role of the board. Many of the findings from research 
specific to sport governance (Inglis, Alexander, & Weaver, 
1999; Shilbury, 2001; Taylor & O’Sullivan, 2009), how-
ever, have important implications for an investigation that 
places strategic function as its central theme.
To learn more about the governance of sport organi-
zations, this study explored what meaning board members 
of national sport organizations (NSOs) attach to the 
concept of “strategic capability”. In so doing the inquiry 
also identified factors considered to constrain or enable 
board strategic function. The present study is part of a 
larger study that sought to determine how boards of NSOs 
could develop their strategic capability using a four-phase 
action research process. This paper specifically focuses 
on the first two phases in an in-depth consideration of 
the meaning of board strategic function, as expressed by 
volunteer board members of two NSOs. In this context, 
the board’s strategic role is considered to be a subset of 
the overall governing function.
The nature and form of NSOs has been well estab-
lished in sport organization theory (Babiak, 2007; Kiku-
lis, Slack, & Hinings, 1995; O’Brien & Slack, 2003) with 
their role as lead sport organizations reconfirmed by a 
series of government reports and initiatives in New Zea-
land, Australia and the UK (Ministerial Taskforce, 2001; 
Crawford Report, 2009; Department of Culture, Media 
and Sport/Strategy Unit, 2002). In light of the central 
position NSOs hold within a sports system, New Zealand-
based NSOs were chosen as the population for this study. 
Known in the UK as National Governing Bodies (NGBs), 
Taylor and O’Sullivan (2009, p. 683) noted, “Given the 
significant role NGBs play in the sporting landscape it is 
not surprising that the way they are governed has become 
such a topical issue”. NSOs in New Zealand have evolved, 
like their Australian, Canadian and UK counterparts, from 
small and independent member-based associations with 
volunteer executives to organizations with paid staff and 
administrative offices. A primary, yet under-researched 
role of the governing group within an NSO, now known 
as the board of directors, is the strategic function (Ferkins, 
Shilbury, & McDonald, 2009; Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). 
Situated within the interpretive research paradigm, and 
using qualitative research methods, this study sought an 
in-depth and “insiders” interpretation from two NSOs 
to “unpack” the meaning of a strategically able board.
Reviewing Board Strategic Function
Within the governance literature, various terms have 
been used to describe board strategic function including 
strategic focus (Huse, 2005), strategic decision-making 
(Forbes & Milliken, 1999), strategic involvement/con-
tribution (Edwards & Cornforth, 2003; Pugliese et al., 
2009), strategic role (Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 2005), 
strategy development (Pettigrew & McNulty, 1998), 
strategic processes (Stiles, 2001), strategic orientation 
(Ingley & van der Walt, 2005), and strategic capability 
(Ferkins, Shilbury, & McDonald, 2009). These labels 
are often used interchangeably, and it is within this 
“family” of concepts (in reference to the role of a gov-
erning board), that this study is situated. In particular, 
the terms “strategic function” and “strategic capability” 
have primarily been adopted, the latter indicating poten-
tial capacity, considered to be a useful perspective for 
exploring this concept (Ferkins, Shilbury, & McDonald, 
2009). As explained above, a further mediating influ-
ence is the context within which the study took place, 
that is, the governance of national sport organizations. 
This section, therefore, provides an overview of the key 
elements regarding what is known within this body of 
knowledge, and how these elements relate to the context 
in question. In so doing, it traverses three distinct but 
related settings, that is, governance within commercial, 
nonprofit, and sport organizations. The distinctions 
between these settings are previously well-documented 
(see Balduck, Van Rossem, & Buelens, 2010; Ferkins, 
Shilbury, & McDonald, 2009; Shilbury, 2001; Taylor & 
O’Sullivan, 2009), with the specific research context in 
question outlined above.
Research Periods on Board  
Strategic Function
Arguably, the greatest insights to date in relation to board 
strategic function come from the commercial setting. 
Pugliese et al. (2009) found that the first scholarly articles 
were published in 1972 (Clendenin, 1972; Heller & 
Milton, 1972), beginning four decades of scholarly debate 
in relation to what they term “board strategic involve-
ment”. In examining the literature between 1972 and 
2007, Pugliese et al. (2009) noted three distinct research 
phases. The first, labeled “The Emerging Debate About 
Boards’ Strategic Involvement” (p. 299), spanned the 
timeframe between 1972 and 1989. According to Pugliese 
et al. this period was characterized by discussion “on the 
desirability of active board involvement, also in the realm 
of strategy” (p. 299) and was set against a backdrop of 
perceived board passivity in the affairs of the corpora-
tion (Stiles & Taylor, 2001). A small number of articles 
were produced during this era leading Zahra and Pearce 
(1989) to conclude that overall, “empirical research on 
the boards’ strategic role is in its infancy stage” (p. 304).
The second period, labeled “The Heyday of ‘Input-
Output’ Approaches” (Pugliese et al., 2009, p. 300) 
encompassed the timeframe 1990–2000. This decade 
represented a concentration of research on the relation-
ship between board characteristics and board structure. 
Heavily influenced by agency theory, this era also drew 
primarily on the US context and a quantitative, outsid-
ers’ view of board strategic function (Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). Although a final outcome 
of this research strand was board strategic performance, 
much of the work during this era appeared to concentrate 
on matters of conformance, such as board CEO-duality, 
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outsider ratio, director’s equity stakes, and tenure (Pug-
liese et al., 2009). The final period between 2001 and 2007 
entitled, “Towards More Pluralism in the Board-Strategy 
Debate” (Pugliese et al., 2009, p. 300), is underlined by 
the emergence of a behavioral and cognitive approach to 
board strategic function. As indicated by the label, this 
line of inquiry employed a broader theoretical approach, 
moved beyond agency theory in particular, and engaged 
qualitative techniques that emphasized the importance of 
context and process (Pye & Pettigrew, 2005). It is in the 
latter tradition of inquiry into board strategic function 
that the current study is situated, and seeks to respond to 
the practical and theoretical need to clarify the notion of 
a “strategic board” within the sport organization setting.
Board Strategic Process Research
A key idea to emerge from a focus on board strategic 
processes has been an understanding that the board’s 
role is beyond compliance and monitoring and, as such, 
not limited to ratification of strategy (Fiegener, 2005). 
Rather, the strategic role necessitates involvement in all 
phases of the strategic decision-making process. This 
has not always been the accepted line of reasoning in 
the literature. Stiles (2001) noted that the “ ... concept of 
involvement in strategy has proved difficult to define” 
(p. 629). He argued that a common view is based on the 
distinction between formulation and evaluation and that 
the board’s involvement in formulation ranges from “ ... 
working with management to develop strategic direction, 
to merely ratifying management’s proposals” (2001, p. 
269). With regard to evaluation, the accepted work style 
of the board has ranged from probing management’s 
evaluation of resource allocations, to simply accepting 
the evaluation that top management provides (Schmidt 
& Brauer, 2006; Stiles, 2001).
Pugliese and Wenstøp (2007) reinforced the 
“fuzziness” associated with the notion of board strate-
gic involvement. They asserted that, “Board strategic 
involvement, albeit challenged by many scholars, is 
widely recognised as one of the major tasks of the board 
.... However, we still lack consensus about the boundary 
of board strategic involvement” (p. 385). In their study on 
small firms, they adopted a definition that “board strategic 
involvement, in general, refers to shaping mission, vision 
and values, identifying important strategic activities and 
scanning the environment for trends and opportunities” 
(p. 386). Although wide-ranging, this definition curi-
ously does not include evaluation of strategic activities 
nor does it provide guidance as to the extent the board 
becomes involved in shaping the aspects noted. This very 
critique demonstrates the difficulty in “nailing down” the 
concept of strategic function. Yet, we know that without 
articulated clarity we cannot hope to advance this func-
tion (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2002). So, the search for an 
understanding of this concept, appropriate to the context 
in question, continues.
In their study of a UK hospital trust, Mueller, 
Sillince, Harvey, and Howorth (2003) noted that boards 
face conflicting requirements in fulfilling the monitoring 
role (considered to need a level of “independence”), and 
the strategy role (considered to require board involvement 
and collaboration with the CEO). Other scholars (e.g., 
Hambrick, Werder, & Zajac, 2008; Kerr & Werther, 2008; 
Mankins, 2007) have noted, there is a complex interplay 
between the board and senior management in relation 
to strategy formation and execution. This interplay is 
further complicated by the growing raft of regulatory 
reforms that enforce a compliance culture on the board 
as the group ultimately accountable for the organiza-
tion. The balance between accountability (compliance), 
control, and strategic direction contains a tension which 
is particularly evident within the nonprofit and sport set-
tings as the sector professionalizes (Ferkins, Shilbury, & 
McDonald, 2009).
Work in the nonprofit arena has advanced support 
for the widely-held assumption that a focus on board 
strategic development will enhance organization effec-
tiveness (Brown, 2005). In one of the few studies focus-
ing on the board’s strategic role, Edwards and Cornforth 
(2003) identified difficulties in explaining board strategic 
contribution in the nonprofit setting. First there is the 
blurring of boundaries between operational detail and 
strategic focus. They considered, that the board’s “… 
understanding of strategic issues may come from expo-
sure to operational detail ...” (p. 78). At the heart of this 
argument is the idea that operational detail may be a 
necessary element of strategic decision-making. Pugliese 
and Wenstøp’s (2007) findings supported this assertion. 
In a survey of 497 Norwegian small firms, noted above, 
Pugliese and Wenstøp (2007) found that board working 
style and board quality aspects appeared to contribute 
more to board strategic involvement than board composi-
tion features. More specifically, they found that the most 
important aspects affecting board strategic involvement 
were board quality attributes. That is, “in small firms, the 
board could actively perform strategic tasks when it has 
acquired in-depth knowledge of the firm, a broad diversity 
in skills, and the motivation to do a good job” (p. 401).
The second concern noted by Edwards and Corn-
forth (2003) was the distinction between “policy” and 
“strategy”. Here the authors stressed that strategy relates 
to how organizations position themselves competitively, 
while policy is “… about giving substance to collective 
values” (p. 78). Thus in a sport organization, concerns 
about gender equity would be matters of policy where as 
a merger with another sport to establish a better competi-
tive position would be a matter of strategy. They consid-
ered that the boundary has become blurred in practice 
within the public and nonprofit setting and that “… the 
discourse of strategy has become predominant” (p. 79). 
Overall, the authors considered that strategic contribution 
is a contested term: “how boards interpret it depends on 
perceptions about the very purpose of quasi-autonomous 
public and non-profit organisations” (p. 79). Similarly, 
Brown and Guo (2010) in a study of 121 community 
foundation executives in the US, found that strategy and 
planning rated as the second most important role of the 
70  Ferkins and Shilbury
board (behind fund development). They also concluded 
that “ … research that explores the board’s involvement in 
strategy must recognize that strategy is a highly complex 
concept that may or most likely not mean the same thing 
to all of the executives” (p. 10).
In an earlier study, Inglis, Alexander, and Weaver 
(1999) also focused on the roles and responsibilities of 
community nonprofit boards and established empirical 
support for involvement by board members in strategic 
activities. They defined “Strategic Activities” as roles that 
relate to planning, setting the vision and mission, policy 
development, evaluating the CEO, and a strong external 
focus. “Strategic activities are future focussed with an 
eye to the external community. They represent the broad 
community context for the organisation” (p. 163). The 
study helps define the notion of board strategic activity 
and affirms the importance of a strategic orientation for 
nonprofit boards. In a follow up study, the work of Inglis 
and Weaver (2000) on prioritizing strategic activities on 
the board agenda provided an insight into how particular 
actions can influence the level of strategic contribution 
by the board.
Bradshaw, Murray, and Wolpin (1992) provided 
important foundational work in exploring the relation-
ship among board structure, process and effectiveness 
within non profit organizations. Four-hundred nonprofit 
Canadian voluntary organizations were surveyed using 
objective indicators of organizational performance 
defined as structural policy characteristics (board size, 
committees, position descriptions and policy manuals) 
and process characteristics (nature and extent of strategic 
planning, meetings, decision-making and conflict). Their 
findings supported other nonprofit research in terms of 
the limited role played by the board, that is, that they 
act “…mostly as trustees rather than entrepreneurs, and 
are largely risk averse” (p. 246). In addition, Bradshaw 
et al. (1992) identified the social constructivist perspec-
tive as an avenue that should be explored in the study of 
nonprofit boards.
Moreover, Hoye and Inglis (2003) presented an over-
view of nonprofit governance models and considered how 
these models could be adapted to the context of leisure 
organizations. In doing so, they noted the association 
between governance models, organization effectiveness 
and strategic expectations. More studies of this kind 
that incorporate the nuances of the nonprofit context are 
needed to increase the empirical knowledge-base around 
the board’s strategic role.
Toward Greater Board  
Strategic Involvement
Despite gaps in our knowledge in relation to board strate-
gic function across any setting, there is growing interest 
in the board of directors’ contribution to strategy and this 
echoes a movement toward more strategic involvement 
by the board (Pugliese et al., 2009). Ferkins, Shilbury, 
and McDonald (2009) in their study of board strategic 
processes found that boards of sport organizations can 
develop their strategic capability by becoming more 
involved in strategy development. This evolution in 
research mirrors a general shift in strategic management 
from a focus on the “content” of strategy, to understand-
ing strategy processes and context (Pettigrew, Thomas, & 
Whittington, 2002; Pugliese et al., 2009). As concluded 
by Pugliese et al. (2009), “Board strategic involvement is 
a latent construct and no single way to define or interpret 
it emerges from the literature” (p. 295). They also con-
cluded that the “more recent line of research posits boards 
as decision-making groups whose internal processes and 
external context should be better understood” (p. 301).
Despite sport traversing the commercial and non-
profit domain, sport boards have in large part adopted cor-
porate governance practice (Taylor & O’Sullivan, 2009). 
The current debate in relation to board process research, 
drawn largely from the commercial setting, is therefore 
instructive for the emerging field of sport governance 
inquiry. Furthermore, a study of sport organizations that 
seeks to explore what meaning board members of NSOs 
attach to the concept of strategic capability is an impor-
tant step toward unlocking the potential of those around 
the boardroom table charged with the current and future 
viability of these important social institutions. There is 
also room for such an investigation to contribute to our 
theoretical “resource box” on governance research.
Method
This study is located within the interpretive research 
paradigm (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). Using a tradition 
of inquiry that seeks to construct knowledge from the 
interpretations of both the research participants and 
researchers, the goal of the study was to build meaning 
around the notion of board strategic function. Interpretiv-
ism, a general term used to capture a collection of related 
perspectives (Edwards & Skinner, 2009), stresses the 
constructed and evolving nature of social reality, reject-
ing the positivist notion that knowledge is objective and 
tangible. Instead, a primary intent of the interpretive 
paradigm, associated with qualitative research methods, 
is to “… understand social reality through the eyes of 
those being studied” (Devine & Heath, 1999, p. 202), 
and to use that understanding to cogenerate knowledge 
between the researchers and research participants (Heron 
& Reason, 2001).
Although the research process was emergent in 
nature, the researchers worked from a platform of prior 
knowledge in relation to board strategic function, as 
explained in the previous sections. These theoretical 
constructs were used in the research design in general, and 
in data generation and analysis, in particular. Theoretical 
perspectives were then integrated into the outcomes by 
the researchers. Cognitive mapping and visual imagery, 
techniques known to help explicate “fuzzy” concepts, 
facilitate group communication, and “help aggregate 
opinions within a group” (Huff & Jenkins, 2002, p. 14), 
were the primary tools used throughout this process. More 
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specifically, three types of qualitative data generation 
methods were employed for the study. They were: partici-
pant observation, interviews (16), and focus groups (4).
Choice of Research Sites  
and Participants
The population for the study was the NSO board group 
(including CEO) in New Zealand. NSO research sites 
were deliberately selected by the research team based 
on: willingness and ability to engage in the proposed 
research (Reason & Bradbury, 2001), logistical consid-
erations (e.g., proximity and access; Tolich & Davidson, 
1999), high experience levels of the phenomena under 
study (Pettigrew, 1990), and evidence of some diversity 
between NSOs selected as well as typical characteristics 
that could enable broader application of the outcomes to 
those beyond the NSOs involved (Stake, 2000). For the 
purposes of this paper, two NSOs were chosen to allow 
for cross-case comparison (Stake, 2000), while the con-
sideration of any more than two was deemed too many 
in terms of volume of data.
University ethics approval was gained for the study, 
and the NSOs selected from the outset agreed to take part 
in the study. The chairpersons and CEOs on behalf of their 
respective NSO also agreed for their organization to be 
named in publications, however, individuals involved in 
the research remained anonymous. All research partici-
pants were also provided with draft copies of publication 
documents where the organizations were named with 
both chairpersons accepting these documents in writing. 
Squash New Zealand and New Zealand Football (soccer) 
were the two NSOs participating in this study. Each NSO 
board group consisted of the CEO and between five and 
seven board members including the chairperson. The 
fieldwork component of the study spanned seven months 
between July 2005 and January 2006, with the lead 
researcher attending almost all monthly board meetings 
during the period of the fieldwork phase.
Data Generation and Analysis
In addition to the data generation techniques noted above, 
reflective journaling, memorandums, theming, writing, 
and member checking were also employed as part of the 
data analysis process (Edwards & Skinner, 2009). During 
the focus group sessions, the lead researcher acted as 
facilitator, drawing out data and testing and reflecting 
on conclusions with the research participants, using 
cognitive mapping and visual imagery techniques (Huff 
& Jenkins, 2002), captured on electronic white boards. 
At other times, the lead researcher played an observatory 
role during board meetings, particularly toward the end 
of the fieldwork phase. All focus groups, board meetings 
and interview situations were video or audio recorded, 
and mind maps drawn on the electronic white board were 
printed and videoed.
While three of the four focus group sessions took 
place within scheduled monthly board meetings, they 
were identified clearly to the research participants as part 
of the data generation process for the research project. As 
such, they were represented on the formal board meet-
ing agenda as the “Board Strategic Capability Research 
Project”. No details pertaining to the focus group data 
were reported in the board minutes, only the fact that 
they took place. The full board meetings were half day 
events for both NSOs and the focus group sessions lasted 
between 60–90 min each.
The fourth focus group was a separately organized 
session and was also clearly identified to the research 
participants as a data generation event. As noted ear-
lier, sixteen individual semistructured interviews were 
also conduced and were scheduled in the intervening 
time between board meetings. Wherever possible these 
interviews took place face to face (10). However, due to 
geographical distance, six interviews were conducted via 
telephone. The individual interviews lasted between 15 
(telephone) and 60 (face to face) minutes.
For the purposes of this paper, quotations used from 
the research participants’ data have been coded as “1” 
(for Squash New Zealand), and “2” (for New Zealand 
Football), followed by the letters ranging between “a-i”. 
This allows for both individual anonymity, and for data 
to be cross-referenced back to individual participants by 
the researchers, demonstrating diligence in the data gen-
eration and analysis process. While there was an overall 
consistency in intent and approach among the two NSOs, 
there were variations in the number and nature of board 
and CEO interactions due to availability and meeting 
scheduling. There were two distinct aspects to the data 
generation process. The first was the “teasing out” of 
board and CEO understanding of strategic function via 
interviews and focus groups. The second was an explora-
tion of those factors the board and CEO felt constrained or 
enabled their own ideal of what constitutes a strategically 
capable board (using a second round of interviews and 
focus groups). The latter enabled a more contextualized 
understanding of board strategic capability. This was evi-
denced in the mapping out of meaning attached to board 
strategic function presented later in this paper.
Limitations
As a cautionary note, it is important to understand what 
this style of research can offer and what it cannot. First, 
an appreciation of the context within which the research 
took place is important. Context influences interpreta-
tion (Pettigrew, 1997; Pye, 2004). The findings and 
discussion section, therefore, seeks to establish context 
within the confines of article length. Regrettably, not all 
contextual factors that may bear influence can be captured 
nor described. Second, there is no attempt to establish a 
definitive definition of board strategic function, merely 
an endeavor to derive and meld the dual interpretations 
of the research participants and researchers to add mean-
ing to the concept. The findings and discussion section 
also endeavors to provide enough first-hand perceptions 
from the research participants for the reader to add their 
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own interpretations alongside those of the researchers. 
This study is, therefore, limited to the context and inter-
pretations offered, and it is left to the reader (with some 
signposts and “maps”) to draw their own conclusions 
from that, and to make connections across other contexts.
Findings and Discussion
The two organizations who participated for the purposes 
of this study were considered to be small- to medium-
sized NSOs (Sport and Recreation New Zealand, 2010). 
Both had between eight and 15 staff working for the 
national office, with a business turnover of between $1 
and $4.4 million per annum. As the larger of the two, 
New Zealand Football had 105,000 registered players, 
seven regional entities, and 325 clubs under its jurisdic-
tion. Squash New Zealand had 28,000 registered players, 
11 regional entities and 231 clubs. While New Zealand 
is a small country with a population of approximately 4 
million, its sporting success on the world stage is well 
recognized (Trenberth, Leberman, & Collins, 2006). It 
has produced world champions in many sports, with 
squash being no exception. Despite hefty international 
competition, New Zealand has also qualified for the 
football world cup twice including narrowly missing 
out on pool advancement at the 2010 FIFA World Cup 
in South Africa. The characteristics of the two NSOs 
involved in the study, in relation to size and scope, are 
typical of numerous other sports found in New Zealand 
such as, athletics, swimming, tennis, bowls, basketball, 
and cycling.
The legal composition of the two boards called for 
a structure that sought to achieve a “skills-based” board 
as distinct from a “representative” board. As part of the 
journey, many NSOs have traveled toward professional-
ization in countries such as Canada, the UK, Australia, 
and New Zealand, and national governing boards are 
rarely made up of representatives of the state/provincial 
associations. Instead, board size has generally been 
reduced to between seven and 10 members (Taylor & 
O’Sullivan, 2009), and the selection process increasingly 
involves both elected and appointed positions. Again, as 
part of a transition process toward a more professional-
ized approach, a co-option clause has been added to a 
number of NSO constitutions in New Zealand to allow 
for appointed members to be added (Sport and Recre-
ation New Zealand, 2006). Board composition of this 
nature is considered to be a “hybrid” which allows for 
the democratic ideals of an election process to remain, 
supplemented by individuals chosen for their professional 
expertise, as well as “outsider” perspectives.
The two NSO boards involved in the study had a 
similar composition and were in keeping with the grow-
ing global trend toward a “hybrid” style of composition 
(Taylor & O’Sullivan, 2009), as noted above. The New 
Zealand Football board, for example, comprised seven 
members with one additional position co-opted. While all 
members were nominated and elected by the membership, 
four of the seven were subject to an additional nation-
wide recruitment process that included interviews. This 
model encouraged three of the board positions to be 
drawn from the provinces/regions and four external 
positions to be recommended by a recruitment panel for 
their governance skills and independence. In actuality, 
most board members were “close” to the game. There 
were three former international players and two heavily 
involved in club and/or regional administration of the 
game before their appointment. There was one female 
member and six male members. The CEO, also a male, 
was appointed by the board and was a nonvoting execu-
tive at board meetings. The Squash New Zealand board 
comprised one “independent” member and five members 
with considerable knowledge of squash and its regional 
and national administration system. Nominations for the 
elected positions came only from the regions/provinces. 
As with the other NSO, the CEO, was a nonvoting par-
ticipant at board meetings. All six board members were 
male, as was the CEO.
In the opinion of the researchers (derived from 
individual interviews, and a review of board member 
credentials), board personnel for the NSOs appeared 
to be highly capable, concerned for the wellbeing and 
future of the organization, knowledgeable about the 
issues of their respective sport, and skilled in governance 
processes and practices. Many held senior positions in 
organizations such as law firms, accounting firms, com-
mercial companies, and large corporations. Aside from 
an apparent lack of diversity (including female and ethnic 
perspectives which are considered to be increasingly 
significant; Pugliese & Wenstøp, 2007; Skirstad, 2009), 
there appeared to be few gaps in expertise in relation to 
current understanding of the sport governing function. 
Such was the context within which an exploration of 
meaning attached to NSO board strategic capability 
commenced.
Exploring the Notion of a Strategic Board
Drawn largely from a focus group setting, the lead 
researcher, acting as facilitator, used mind-mapping 
techniques to directly draw out perceptions of strategic 
function from the research participants. Working initially 
with the Squash New Zealand board and CEO, the first 
question posed was: “If I say strategically capable – what 
does that mean to you?” In response, the participants 
noted six different aspects (in no particular order) they 
believed contributed to a strategically capable board. 
These were: a range and mix of skills; big picture or 
long-term thinking; a vision or picture of the future; expe-
rience in relevant areas especially knowledge of squash; 
looking externally; and being focused on the work at 
hand. Responses to the next question, “What character-
istics would you assign to strategic behavior?”, included 
an ability to be impartial, objectivity, being inquisitive, 
open-mindedness, and creating a group dynamic that is 
conducive to meaningful discussion where viewpoints 
can be debated in a nonthreatening environment.
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For New Zealand Football, also largely derived from 
a focus group situation, the board and CEO noted eight 
different aspects they believed contributed to a strategi-
cally capable board. These were: has an overview that 
covers all areas of the business; determines the long-term 
goals and provides the roadmap; a highly-focused board; 
a board that is detached and beholden to no particular 
faction; is paternalistic in approach; can determine the 
strategic focus and is able to facilitate execution (as 
distinct from doing); monitors against progress; and can 
distinguish the line between setting policy and executing 
it. As a board grouping, all members contributed to this 
list of characteristics and there was general agreement 
once the elements were finalized.
Distinguishing Between “Strategic”  
and “Operational”
As highlighted by Edwards and Cornforth (2003) and 
Pugliese and Wenstøp (2007), a significant aspect of 
board strategic function may be the complex interplay 
between what is traditionally understood to be “strategic” 
aspects, and notions of “operational” detail. The lead 
researcher, therefore, asked how the board distinguishes 
between strategic activity and operational activity. One 
Squash New Zealand board member (1b) responded by 
explaining that he sees the board’s role in terms of ques-
tioning and inquiring based on a structured framework 
(that is, the strategic plan). Another response related to 
the idea that the board seeks evidence that things are hap-
pening rather than being too involved in the actions (1f). 
Other responses noted that the board monitors what is 
going on rather than “doing”, and the difference between 
strategic aspects and operational aspects is often the level 
of detail sought and discussed. Being strategic “ … is 
staying with the big picture, operations is considering 
the day-to-day issues” (1c).
The Squash New Zealand participants were then 
asked if this distinction “works” in their boardroom 
situation. The response was twofold: the first related to 
the idea that sometimes the lines get blurred and that 
often professionally-skilled board members are asked to 
operate at two levels. For example, “An accountant on the 
board takes an interest in implementation aspects of the 
accounts” (1c) and, if money is scarce, the professionally-
skilled board members do some of the work instead of 
paying for it externally. The second point related to 
board impartiality: “Sometimes board members have 
their own agenda and when they’ve got that agenda they 
drop down into the operational level to achieve it. So, if 
they don’t have impartiality then they can drop down into 
operational matters” (1a).
When the New Zealand Football board members 
were asked how the board distinguishes between strategic 
aspects and operational aspects, one responded by stat-
ing: “I think there’s a lack of understanding about what 
a board of governance actually is and … in football, 
historically, we have not been that clear about it, but 
now we know what we should and should not be doing” 
(2a). There was agreement from two other longer-serving 
board members that, historically, the board had been 
too involved in management. One noted: “Yes, there’s 
been a shift in the way we work …” (2c). Another board 
member offset this in stating: “I would also caution that 
the balance for us is fragile”. He further added that “… 
in the absence of strategy you force the CEO to act in a 
certain way and then you wake up and realize the CEO 
is calling the shots” (2f). In emphasizing the significance 
of an agreed strategy developed by the board, the same 
board member offered that, “If we have a good strategy 
we can step back, but we have some work to do there. 
We are still getting involved in management because we 
don’t have a well-defined strategy” (2f).
A further point was offered by the New Zealand Foot-
ball board on the matter of how the board distinguishes 
between strategic aspects and operational aspects in the 
context of personnel changes. “Every time the board 
changes, or the CEO, you get a different understanding 
and you have to re-confirm what it means” (2a). This point 
related to instances when it is considered helpful to have 
board members contributing operational expertise. “A 
good board has people who can do operational functions, 
so you don’t want to isolate the board from doing those 
functions either and you need those skills in sport” (2d). 
The same board member also stressed that, “As long as 
the operational work is within the strategic framework 
then being involved operationally doesn’t undermine the 
strategic focus” (2d).
Propositional and Practical Knowing
In an attempt to differentiate between “propositional 
knowing” (knowing through ideas and theories, expressed 
in informative statements) and “practical knowing” 
(knowing ‘how to do’ something, expressed in a skill, 
knack or competence; Heron & Reason, 2001, p. 183), 
the opportunity arose to ask the Squash New Zealand 
board to describe situations and initiatives they felt had 
been approached with a strong strategic focus on their 
part. These included the process in working through the 
regional funding and support strategy. In this situation it 
was noted the board first “… looked to the future, then 
we considered our options and weighed up the pros 
and cons … ” (1b). The board is now in the process of 
choosing the best option. Once this is done “… it’s down 
at the operational level” (1b). Another example is the 
high-performance program. There was general consensus 
that this program is well-designed, well-structured and 
organized, and there are clear boundaries and established 
goals within which to make ongoing decisions. These 
examples led on to a general feeling that the board is good 
at establishing frameworks and structures for operations 
people to work within, and that in both instances there 
has been clarity about the desired outcome.
Metaphors and/or visual images that create a sense 
of the tangible from the intangible have been found to be 
helpful in explicating meaning in this domain (Ambrosini 
& Bowman, 2002; Lambert & Parvinen, 2003). The next 
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question posed by the lead researcher, therefore, asked 
the board to articulate an image of strategic capability. 
“If you were asked to assign an image to the concept of 
‘being strategic’ – what would that be and why?” Three 
images were offered:
• “A ball – because it’s got no sharp edges and looks 
in every direction” (1f)
• “The sun – because it is overreaching, overlooking 
and has no edges” (1d)
• “A sponge – because you have to absorb a lot of 
information you have to relate to, both internal and 
external, and you can get swamped but you have to 
keep on absorbing and what you do with it is like 
squeezing it out through a sieve” (1b).
The New Zealand Football board were also asked 
what kind of image they thought would represent a stra-
tegically capable board. The response was also threefold:
• The sun—representing a life force
• Rainbow—the board is overarching
• Paddock/field—the board sets the boundaries.
What Does this Mean?
This exploration of what a strategically capable board 
means to the Squash New Zealand and New Zealand 
Football boards appeared to fit with generic theoretical 
concepts of what constitutes “being strategic”. Wheelen 
and Hunger (2000) considered a strategic perspective to 
include a big-picture, long-term view of the organization 
and one where there is a focus on the whole organization. 
A consideration of both internal and external environ-
mental factors is also considered an important component 
(Pugliese & Wenstøp, 2007). Along similar lines, van der 
Walt and Ingley (2003) considered that the “… strategic 
function of the board involves making critical decisions, 
particularly in relation to strategic changes, so the orga-
nization can adapt to environmental change” (p. 17).
While some board members contributed more than 
others, it was clear there was consensus among the group 
regarding the responses. The lead researcher then pro-
vided the groups with a summary of points (hand-outs) 
relating to board strategic function drawn from academic 
literature (as set out earlier in this paper). Many of the 
points noted by the board appeared in this description of 
a strategic board. As stated by one of the New Zealand 
Football board members: “… if we go through the hand-
outs, we cover off most bases” (2e). The Squash New 
Zealand board noted the concept of accountability was not 
emphasized in their earlier discussion. They considered 
it an important element to strategic function, however. 
In contrast, the New Zealand Football board did note the 
monitoring function as part of a strategic board’s role in 
the initial series of questions. Importantly, both boards 
and CEOs emphasized the significance of a well-defined 
strategy or “framework” in enabling the board to main-
tain a strategic focus. For New Zealand Football, this 
was mainly to ensure the CEO did not dominate, and for 
Squash New Zealand, this was mostly in relation to ensur-
ing the board did not become too operationally involved.
As noted earlier, the strategic contribution of the 
board may well traverse multiple aspects of the generic 
governance themes of performance and conformance. In 
discussing the place of accountability (or conformance) 
within the strategic function of a board, both boards 
appeared to affirm the need to include this aspect. The 
Squash New Zealand board also considered they had a 
strong social dynamic and felt that enjoying themselves 
during board engagements was an important facilitator of 
strategic debate and expansive thinking in the board room. 
While not included in the hand-out provided, van der 
Walt, Ingley, Shergill, and Townsend (2006) emphasized 
board dynamics as a key aspect of board effectiveness.
Overall, it was clear the groups had a sound grasp of 
their role in “being strategic” and were able to articulate 
and critique this during the focus group sessions. In addi-
tion, the use of metaphors and/or visual images that were 
offered by both groups helped to create a shared under-
standing of the notion of strategic capability (between 
board members and for the purposes of the current study). 
Similarities across the two boards such as associating the 
notion of strategic capability with the sun, a rainbow, and 
a ball, pointed toward the overarching nature of “being 
strategic” while also establishing boundaries for the CEO 
(paddock/field). The idea of seeking relevant information 
for good decision-making was embedded within the 
metaphor of a “sponge” that needed to be “squeezed” 
and filtered, and related to the environmental scanning 
role of a strategically capable board.
The next part of the data generation process was to 
ascertain how each board considered it was performing 
in relation to this picture of strategic function, and in 
particular, what might impede and enable board strategic 
function. This was done to contextualize the emerging 
meaning attached to board strategic function.
Contextualizing the Ideal:  
How Are We Doing?
The Squash New Zealand board was asked a series of 
questions designed to highlight aspects considered to 
both impede and enable board strategic function. Once 
again, mind mapping techniques were used and captured 
on a white board to and help structure the discussion as 
it took place. The first part identified what the Squash 
New Zealand board considered to be their strengths and 
weaknesses in relation to strategic function. The strengths 
centered largely on their relationship with their internal 
stakeholders, that is, provincial and club personnel and 
volunteers: “… we have a strong relationship with the 
squash community and we have a lot of goodwill. It’s not 
our way or the highway” (1a). Another board member 
noted: “We don’t have direct representation (on the 
board), we work on goodwill; it’s consensus decision-
making” (1b). Another noted strength, as established 
above, was the board’s understanding of strategic gover-
Good Boards Are Strategic: What Does That Mean for Sport Governance?  75
nance processes and its work in implementing these, such 
as having a strategic framework in place and using this 
framework to structure the work of the board during and 
outside of meetings. “In terms of what’s talked about at 
governance training sessions, you get the impression we 
are talking about the right things. We have our strategy 
in place and good board processes around that” (1a).
Of the aspects noted in terms of weaknesses for 
Squash New Zealand, one stood out and was explained as:
Our biggest dissatisfaction has been our inability 
to improve numbers; for the clubs to grow. You can 
operate strategically at national board level but you 
have to be able to roll that strategy out to club level 
and make an impact there. (1f)
Another member noted that, “… it seems that we 
do most processes pretty well but if you judge yourself 
on the end result (i.e., high performance, participation, 
growth etc.), then we’ve got some way to go” (1b). A 
further comment was, “It feels like we have no con-
trol over the level of input and expertise at the district 
level” (1d). During a further focus group discussion, at 
which time the lead researcher also checked emerging 
interpretations with the research participants, the same 
impediment arose in relation to the board realizing its 
strategic potential. “It’s always been an issue about lead-
ership at the district level and the lack of leadership …” 
commented one board member (1d). Another followed 
with: “And lack of strategy at district level – there’s no 
strategy at all, it’s all day-to-day” (1f). The discussion 
was summarized by the following sentiment in explain-
ing board strategic capability: “Things that we can do as 
a board to help our overall strategy, end goal and ability 
to reach clubs” (1b).
For New Zealand Football, the richest data to 
emerge in relation to exploring aspects that might impede 
or enable board strategic function (and thus create a 
sharper contextual focus for this board), were derived 
from individual interviews with board members and the 
CEO. The overwhelming barrier identified was the lack 
of strategic framework for decision-making. This was 
expressed in a number of different ways. “We haven’t 
really looked ahead and if we could change that, it would 
be a massive leap forward” (2c). Another stated, “I think 
there is a lack of identifying strategic priorities” (2d). A 
further board member stated that, “acting strategically 
doesn’t come naturally - to help us with this we need a 
process or framework for decision-making that makes 
us look at the long-term direction and where we want 
to be going” (2a).
A second aspect in terms of barriers and enablers to 
board strategic function, that emerged consistently for 
New Zealand Football, related to the need to “get more 
out of the board” (2i). Along similar lines, one board 
member felt that the board needed to be more involved 
and that, “We need a board that is not marching to the 
CEO or any other person’s agenda”. (2f). For him this 
meant a “… board operating as being in charge … where 
the tail is not wagging the dog” (2f). Another noted, 
“ … our meetings are very institutionalized, we are just 
following previous formatting and not really thinking 
about the best way to structure them” (2i). A further 
board member felt that sometimes boards hide behind 
the word governance and do not become informed 
enough to govern. In his words, “We have been very 
much in the hands of the office … for the way the board 
operates” (2h). A different board member also expressed 
the notion that: “New Zealand Soccer (football board) 
takes the lead from the CEO, rather than the other way 
around” (2d).
What Does This Mean?
As the above discussion demonstrates, a key impediment 
for the Squash New Zealand board was the capability of 
the districts in delivering on the national board’s strategic 
priorities. Ferkins and Shilbury (2010) examined the 
national-regional governing relationship with regard to 
board strategic capability in sport, and found that Tennis 
New Zealand also considered the provincial delivery 
mechanism to be an impediment to board strategic func-
tion. They stated that, “In particular, the board’s ability to 
enact its strategic priorities could be enhanced by creating 
a more collaborative partnership with its regional entities 
and engaging in a power-sharing approach that seeks 
to develop regional capability” (p. 235). There are few 
studies in sport and in the wider nonprofit literature that 
consider the relationships between regional and national 
associations (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). Even fewer make 
the connection between board strategic function and 
interorganizational relationships (IORs). Ferkins and 
Shilbury (2010) promoted “the significance of the feder-
ated network on board strategic capability, specifically 
in relation to the board’s ability to enact its strategy” (p. 
252). In doing so, IORs were linked with board strategic 
capability. Similar findings were also evident within the 
current study. Given this, further empirical investigations 
of this aspect, in relation to board strategic function, is 
certainly warranted.
The Squash New Zealand board considered it had 
sound processes in place, was acting and thinking strategi-
cally, but was not achieving the organizational outcomes 
as effectively as desired. In this regard, board discussion 
around strategic capability for Squash New Zealand also 
focused on outcomes as well as processes. McNulty and 
Pettigrew (1999) argued, there exists a “… crucial analyti-
cal requirement to study both the content and the process 
of board involvement in strategy” (p. 51) and that the 
“what” of strategic involvement can only be effectively 
examined through its inseparable links with the process, 
or “how”, of strategic involvement. The Squash New 
Zealand board members were clearly considering both 
process and content (or outcome) in their consideration 
of aspects that might prevent or enable board strategic 
function.
In relation to New Zealand Football, in the sport 
governance domain there has been strong interest in 
the interaction between the CEO and board resulting 
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in a number of studies that have considered this aspect 
of board dynamics (Auld & Godbey, 1998; Ferkins, 
Shilbury, & McDonald, 2009; Hoye, 2006; Hoye & 
Cuskelly, 2003a,b; Inglis, 1994, 1997b; Kikulis, 2000; 
Searle, 1989; Shilbury, 2001). In particular, these studies 
have explored the balance of power and influence that 
the CEO holds in relation to the board. Often referred to 
as “shared leadership”, the primary outcome has been a 
noted increase in influence by the CEO (Shilbury, 2001). 
Ferkins, Shilbury, and McDonald (2009) also found that 
it was unhelpful for the CEO to dominate the board in 
terms of developing board strategic function and that 
“greater board involvement in strategy advanced the 
board’s ability to perform its strategic function” (p. 245). 
A further finding determined, “the importance of shared 
leadership between the board and the CEO, the complex 
interplay in balancing this relationship and the need to 
integrate strategy into board processes” (p. 245). This 
finding sits alongside a growing body of evidence from 
the commercial setting, indicating that an increasingly 
accepted “definition” of board strategic function is the 
expectation that the board will be involved in strategy 
alongside the CEO (Pugliese & Wenstøp, 2007; Ruigrok, 
Peck, & Keller, 2006; Stiles, 2001). Findings from the 
New Zealand Football case study also indicates that 
greater board involvement, to create a shared leader-
ship situation, would be desired for developing strategic 
function.
Mapping Meaning Attached  
to Board Strategic Capability
Huff and Jenkins (2002) considered cognitive maps, 
and visual images to be tangible and flexible tools that 
can help reveal and articulate knowledge. “As a means 
to make knowledge more explicit and more likely to be 
shared, debated and revised, maps become a dynamic 
basis for knowledge creation” (p. 15). It is with this 
approach in mind that the final section of the discussion 
has been developed. It is also important to note that the 
use of a cognitive map in this way does not provide a 
direct portrayal of individual or collective knowledge 
(Huff & Jenkins, 2002). Instead, this technique has been 
employed to “sketch out” the boundaries and key ele-
ments of board strategic capability, drawn from what 
we currently know and integrated with the meaning that 
the two NSO boards attach to this concept. This section 
explains the development of a cognitive map (Figure 1).
There are, of course, many different ways to inter-
pret the conversations outlined above. It is, therefore, 
acknowledged that the following map provides but one 
interpretation. As per the research process, much care has 
been taken to ensure logical links between data as they 
are transformed into evidence. The concepts presented 
are also derived or influenced by the literature outlined 
earlier. In asking what meaning board members attached 
to the notion of board strategic capability, the responses 
Figure 1 — Mapping board strategic capability.
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focused on the capabilities of individual board members 
and therefore the collective capability of the group. A 
range and mix of skills including a “hybrid” board com-
position; big picture or long-term thinking; a board that 
is detached and beholden to no particular faction; experi-
ence in relevant areas especially knowledge of the sport; 
and being focused on the work at hand, for example, relate 
to the capability of people sitting around the board room 
table to be able to undertake these functions. As the data 
generation and analysis process unfolded, the emphasis 
on capable people as a primary element of board stra-
tegic capability became increasingly obvious. The idea 
of who the board comprises and the skills they bring as 
an indication of board performance is, of course, well-
established in theory and practice (Balduck, Van Rossem, 
& Buelens, 2010; Pettigrew & McNulty, 1998). As set 
out in Figure 1, this element was, therefore, chosen as 
one of four “directional signposts” that served to map out 
the meaning of board strategic capability. To further flesh 
out this element, three representative examples relating to 
“capable people” were also chosen based on the emphasis 
both NSO boards gave to these aspects (see Figure 1).
The second element, shown in Figure 1, when map-
ping out board strategic capability related to having an 
established frame of reference. There were a number of 
statements made by board members and the CEOs from 
both NSOs (across all question categories) that connected 
strategic function with having a road map, strategy, or 
defined boundaries to work within. In particular, both 
NSOs emphasized the importance of the board determin-
ing the overall direction of the organization and ensuring 
there were clearly marked out boundaries for all mem-
bers of the organization in terms of purpose (mission) 
and aspiration (vision). This element was also chosen 
because of growing scholarly debate regarding the need 
for active board involvement in strategy (Ferkins, Shil-
bury, & McDonald, 2009; Kerr & Werther, 2008; Stiles, 
2001). Two further subelements were chosen as examples 
of establishing a frame of reference. These were also 
representative of the responses offered by the two board 
groups, and provided empirical evidence of the deeper 
meaning attached to board involvement in strategy (e.g., 
Edwards & Cornforth, 2003; Pugliese & Wenstøp, 2007).
The third element chosen was “facilitative board 
processes”. Again, a number of statements were made by 
the NSO boards that indicated the importance of sound 
meeting process. Such aspects related to ensuring a board 
work plan was in place and that the board meetings had 
a purpose that revolved around the agreed organization 
strategy. Board processes also emerged within the dis-
cussion relating to the role of the CEO versus the role 
of the board, and the need for the board to be actively 
engaged, thereby sharing the leadership responsibility 
with the CEO. There is strong empirical evidence that 
points toward shared leadership and facilitative board 
processes as key qualities of strategic function (Inglis, 
1997a; Inglis, Alexander, & Weaver; 1999; Pye & Pet-
tigrew, 2005).
The next element chosen was “facilitative regional 
relationships”. While this element was primarily derived 
from the Squash New Zealand discussions, it was also 
an underlying aspect for New Zealand Football as the 
board grappled with the need to establish a frame of 
reference for the regions to operate within. Again, three 
examples of this element were chosen to provide more 
detail as to what was meant by this concept. Stiles and 
Taylor (2001) noted that the board is also responsible 
for “the structural context of the firm, which includes 
determining the organizational architecture …” (p. 35). 
In the sport governance literature, however, there has been 
little reference, as yet, that links the governing role of the 
board in general and the strategic function in particular 
to the complex “architecture” of and relationships with 
the sport’s affiliated regional entities. As detailed earlier, 
Ferkins and Shilbury (2010) have empirically established 
the link between strategic function, regional relationships 
and governing structure. In addition, Hoye and Cuskelly 
(2007) made reference to the potential impact of inter-
organizational relationships within the governing role of 
sport boards. Based on this emerging knowledge and data 
generated from the NSO focus groups and interviews, this 
aspect formed the final element of the conceptual map.
These four elements were checked with research 
participants to ensure they “rang true” (Mertens, 2005) in 
terms of the emerging map. This was done with the two 
CEOs in interview and via a written memo, as well as 
with the board members in a subsequent board meeting. 
In comparing the two NSO boards in relation to their own 
assessment of current strategic function, the Squash New 
Zealand board appeared to be more “advanced” in the ele-
ments assigned to the cognitive map. While both boards 
seemed to have capable people who matched those ele-
ments deemed important for strategic function (as noted 
earlier), New Zealand Football had a more immediate 
hurdle in the absence of an articulated strategy that the 
board had been involved in designing. In this comparison, 
it also became obvious there was a sense of progression 
between the four elements within the cognitive map.
Conclusion
This study sought to probe meaning attached to the notion 
of board strategic capability. In working with two NSO 
boards in New Zealand, a cognitive map was developed 
that expressed four primary elements, three of which 
were also evident within related literature. In essence, 
the meaning of board strategic capability was found to 
be related to the need to have capable people, a frame 
of reference, facilitative board processes, and facilita-
tive regional relationships. The latter was found to be a 
new element, especially significant for models of ‘sport’ 
governance because of the existence of affiliated regional 
entities and the necessary reliance on these entities and 
volunteers in delivering strategic priorities for the sport.
In terms of the sense of progression noted earlier, 
these elements might also be expressed as a sequence 
of steps through which the NSO board might travel on 
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its journey toward achieving a high-performing strate-
gic board. For example, to even begin to function as a 
strategic board, a first step is having people around the 
board room table who can think and act strategically, 
have knowledge of the sport, and can be inquisitive and 
impartial. As a second step, there was also a strong indi-
cation from both boards as well as evidence drawn from 
the literature (Kerr & Werther, 2008; Stiles, 2001) that an 
organization needs to have a clearly articulated strategy, 
where the board has been involved in its development.
“Facilitative board processes” appeared to be the next 
advancement that Squash New Zealand had achieved, and 
that New Zealand Football was still seeking to develop. 
Squash New Zealand board’s next challenge was to create 
a governing system whereby the organization strategy 
could be effectively implemented via the regional delivery 
mechanism. For this element, the emphasis was on build-
ing better relationships and processes which may or may 
not include a change in the sport’s governing architecture.
Increasingly, scholars have argued for greater depth 
in understanding in relation to the strategic role of the 
board, and an understanding of the process and context 
within which this role takes place (Pugliese & Wenstøp, 
2007; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005; Stiles, 2001). In sport 
governance, while it is acknowledged that the strategic 
role of the board is crucial to organization performance, 
it has also been noted that there is a critical gap in our 
knowledge regarding this aspect of sport governance 
(Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). The present study serves to add 
additional meaning to the notion of board strategic func-
tion. By their very existence, maps and metaphors frame 
a particular landscape, establishing more clearly the 
subject of consideration (Huff & Jenkins, 2002). “What 
is included in the frame is much easier to identify, and 
challenge. Alternative frames are easier to imagine once 
a first alternative is made more explicit. Maps even make 
the absent more obvious” (Huff & Jenkins, 2002, p. 3).
The map and metaphors derived from this study pro-
vides a starting point in further explicating the meaning 
of board strategic capability. Further investigation could 
“tease out” a better understanding of the need for balance 
between elements (such as between those identified as 
conformance and performance), noted as a tension within 
the governing role (Mankins, 2007). Another aspect that 
warrants further investigation is the balance between what 
is considered to be a strategic focus versus an operational 
focus. Highlighted by Edwards and Cornforth (2003), 
there was also an emphasis given by the NSOs’ boards 
involved in this study regarding the need to understand 
operational aspects to contribute to strategic decision-
making. Finally, the extent of board involvement in 
strategy (captured within the frame of reference element) 
is also a theme worthy of more empirical focus within the 
sport setting. Perhaps the use of figurative language and 
techniques to present research findings can help unlock 
not only greater clarity in meaning for scholars but also 
provide governance practitioners with more accessible 
guidelines and models in their endeavors to become high-
performing strategic boards.
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